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ThE W ar WbhiN a W a r : DissENT in tMe 
Vie t n a m  E ra MiliTARy
Jaimes R. Hayes
The signing of the Indochina peace agreements in early 1973 
officially ended American participation in the Vietnam conflict. Military 
officials would probably be the first to admit that they, more than any 
other group in society, experienced the first sigh of relief. Throughout 
most of the war, the military was subjected to invectives emanating from 
a war-weary civilian sector, as well as disgruntled, ant iwar, anti-military 
GIs. While civil-military relations have a well-documented tradition of 
animosity, organized protest within the ranks is without parallel in 
American military history.1 For military traditionalists, the presence of 
a small but vocal minority of soldiers raising the old ideal of a “democratic 
military” produced some acute anxiety. Contrary to its functionalist 
image of human nature and dissent , the military was forced to come to 
grips with the reality that internal discontent ran deeper than the mere 
disaffections of a few disruptive, “bad” individuals.2
This essay describes and analyzes the effort by a minority of GIs 
to create an antiwar, anti-military movement within the Vietnam-era 
military. An attenuated chronology of the movement is presented along 
with an analysis of what appeared to be the major causal variables in its 
genesis and development.
ThE MiliTARy FiqhTS It seU
Beginning in the latter part of the 1960s, an unprecedented 
movement of soldier dissent gathered momentum. Originating primarily 
as an antiwar movement, it escalated to a point where it was a force 
waging a battle against military authority and legitimacy. While 
desertion. AWOLs, drug use, and even fraggings have long plagued the 
United Stales military, organized resistance appears to be a uniquely 
Vietnam-era phenomenon. The social movement characteristics exhibited 
by the movement (e.g., a sense of group identity and solidarity, consciously 
articulated ideologies, movement organizations) distinguished it from 
other more spontaneous and transitory uprisings such as the “Back 
Home Movement” in the aftermath of World War II. Adjustment
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responses such as drug use and various types of withdrawal reactions 
such as desertion and AWOL will not be discussed in the context ol this 
art icle; the degree to which these various forms of dissent are politically 
motivated is open to debate.3
Although there was one well publicized instance of an officers’ 
organization—The Concerned Officers Movement (COM), and antiwar 
group that disassociated itself from the more radical GI groups— and a 
lesser-known and smaller group—The Concerned Graduates of the 
Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies, headquartered in San Francisco 
and largely limited to ex-officers in that area—the GI movement was for 
the most part comprised of lower-ranking enlisted personnel (“enlisted" 
referring to st at us and not to mode of entiy into the service), predominant ly 
Army but cutting across all branches of the armed services. Short of 
revolutionary in outlook and ideology, the movement aimed primarily at 
institutional structural reform. There was no accurate measure of the 
numerical strength of the movement, and the estimates vary according 
to source— the military appears to underestimate while movement 
sympathizers tend to exaggerated It is safe to say, however, that the 
movement represented only a small fraction of GIs.
THe E a r Iy Y ears
Like other movements of the period, the GI movement emerged 
in a rather piecemeal and disorderly fashion. Movements tend to emerge 
as rather amorphous, poorly organized, and fonnless entities, develop in 
periods of cultural drift, and the early action tends to be individualistic 
in nature and lackinggroup consciousness. The GI movement witnessed 
its beginning in a series of individual acts of resistance against the war. 
These initial exemplary acts occurred during a period (1965-1967) in 
which the Vietnam conflict and American military involvement in it were 
becoming increasingly important concerns for both the civilian and 
military sectors.
One of the first publicized incidents of resistance occurred in 
November of 1965 when Lt. Henry H. Howe, Jr. participated in an 
antiwar demonstration in El Paso, Texas. How was court-martialed and 
charged with disrespectful utterances toward public officials for carrying 
a sign which read: “End Johnson’s Fascist Aggression in Vietnam,” and 
“Let's Have More Than a Choice Between Petty Ignorant Fascists in 
1968." In December, 1965, Howe was convicted and sentenced to two 
years hard labor (later reduced to one) and dishonorably discharged. 
Howe’s conviction raised the ire of some because the military presented 
no clear evidence that Howe’s conduct threatened military discipline and 
order, particularly in light of the fact that he was off-duty as well as out 
of uniform.
The most celebrated case of GI antiwar resistance during 1966 
took place on June 30, when three enlisted men at Fort Hood refused 
shipment to Vietnam on the grounds that it was an immoral war. The
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refusal by Pvt. Dennis Mora, Pfc. James Johnson, and Pvt. David Samas 
was the first case of overt resistance against shipment to the war zone. 
All were given dishonorable discharges and forfeiture of all pay; Samas 
and Johnson were sentenced to five years at hard labor, Mora to three. 
The case of the “Fort Hood Three” gained broader significance when a 
number of civilian activists became involved in it in an effort to make it 
a cause celebre. Although most civilian activists still viewed the GI with 
some disdain, a few were beginning to realize that the GI could be a 
potential ally in the antiwar struggle.
Perhaps the most significant and important individual act of 
antiwar resistance in the entire 1965-1967 period was the case of Capt. 
Howard Levy. Levy, a dennatologist, refused to train Green Beret medics 
for duty in Vietnam, citing the commission of war crimes by the special 
forces as one reason. Levy was accused not only of disobeying an order, 
but also of attempting to “crush the spirit” of enlisted men with his 
continued criticism of the war. On June 3, 1967, Levy was sentenced to 
three years hard labor and dismissed from the service. The Levy case 
received nationwide attention and the military had created a martyr. 
Less than two months after Levy’s conviction, two black marines, Pfc. 
George Daniels and Cpl. William Harvey, were arrested for taking part 
in a barracks discussion where they argued that blacks should not take 
part in the Vietnam war. They were convicted; Daniels was sentenced 
to ten years hard labor and Harvey to six. Their conviction and 
subsequent sentencing not only raised more questions about extreme 
military oppression but was also attacked as racist. Another case of 
officer resistance to the war also took place in 1967 when Air Force Capt. 
Dale Noyd was convicted and imprisoned for refusing to train pilots for 
Vietnam.
The above examples constitute only a select number of antiwar 
acts that occurred in 1965-1967. The formative years of the movement 
were typified by a number of different individuals engaging in similar 
behaviors, but acting independently of each other with no real 
communication existing among them. The early resisters played a key 
role by drawing attention to the possibility of political dissent in the 
military, and, perhaps more importantly, by using the war issue as a 
vehicle, they brought to the surface the larger issue constitutional rights 
for military personnel, particularly enlisted persons. They did, however, 
suffer a heavy toll for their actions as prison sentences and dishonorable 
discharges constituted the backbone of the military defense.
H ie Biq Y ear : 1968
'fhe individual acts of confrontation which characterized the 
1965-1967 years continued throughout the duration of the war. Beginning 
in 1968. the frequency of individual acts of resistance declined, and 
dissent of a collective nature look precedence. It was also in 1968 that 
some of the defining traits of a social movement were first discernible.
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What had been uncoordinated and disconnected acts of resistance 
began to coalesce around an organizational framework. The organizational 
network was decentralized (in that no central decision-making 
headquarters existed) and segmented (in the sense that a number of 
groups arose and operated essentially independent of each other, linked 
only by a common mission and communications network. Consciousness 
of membership and joint interact ion were created by the establishment 
of the G1 underground press—The Bond, FFA, Vietnam GI, The Ally— and 
coffeehouses— Mad Anthony’s and the UFO. Movement cells, such as 
the American Servicemen’s Union (ASU) and theFTA, developed programs 
and ideologies. The ASU and FTAwere followed in 1969 by the GIs United 
Against the War in Vietnam (GIs—United), and the Movement for a 
Democratic Military (MDM). In May of 1969, the GI Alliance was 
constituted in Washington to serve as an umbrella organization with the 
intention of coordinating the actions of the various movement cells. 
While the specific ideological positions of the GI groups varied, their 
goals overlapped considerably and called for such things as an end to 
racism in the military, collective bargaining, federal minimum wage 
standards, and, most importantly, full constitutional rights for all 
enlisted people.5
1968 proved to be a banner year for the GI movement in a variety 
of ways. Collective resistance against the war came to the forefront and 
manifested itself in a variety of styles. In addition to the war-related 
protest, stockade rebellions added a new dimension to GI resistance.
A new strain of antiwar resistance originated in 1968 as a 
number of military personnel across the country took sanctuary in 
various churches and universities. In July, nine GIs representing all 
four sendees chained themselves together inside a San Francisco church 
and held a 48-hour vigil in protest of the war. Army Pfc. Michael Locianto 
was arrested in August after he had taken sanctuary in a Greenwich 
Village church following his refusal logo to Vietnam. Also protesting the 
war. Marine Cpl. Paul Olimpieri took sanctuaiy in the Harvard Divinity 
School in the fall of 1968. In November, Army Pvt. John Michael 
O’Connor was arrested by milit ary police after he had taken refuge in the 
Student Union at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 
approximately 1,000 MIT students fried to shield O’Connor from the 
police in that instance. On November 8th, Army Pvt. William Brakefield 
and Airman David Copp were arrested after they had sought sanctuaiy 
on the campus of New York City College. The use of sanctuaries— 
particularly churches—by antiwar GIs was increasingly facilitated as 
more and more clergy adopted an antiwar stance.
There was a dramatic growth in the number of GIs part icipat ing 
in antiwar demonstrations and teach-ins in 1968. The most significant 
participation occurred on October 12 when GI and civilian antiwar 
marches were held in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Washington DC, New York, 
and Chicago. The Veterans Stars and Stripes fo r  Peace reported that an 
estimated 200 GIs led the march in Chicago. Approximately 700 GIs took
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part in the October 12 march in San Francisco. At Fort Campbell, 
Kentucky, 35 GIs held an October 12th antiwar rally in sympathy with 
the nationwide protests. The stockade was turned back over to the 
authorities only after the military police were ordered to shoot to kill. An 
estimated 40-50 prisoners from the Navy, Marines, and Army held the 
stockade in Da Nang, Vietnam for three days in August, protesting poor 
condit ions and military authoritarianism; once cell-block was burned to 
the ground in this eruption. Also in Vietnam during August, GIs revolted 
at the Long Binh stockade, and a GI was killed by the military police and 
another 59 were wounded. The most publicized case of collective 
resistance wit hin stockades occurred in October when 27 inmates of the 
Presidio stockade (San Francisco) mutinied in protest over the slaying of 
a fellow prisoner.0 The trial of the “Presidio 27” brought massive criticism 
upon the military due to the severe nat ure of the punishment meted out 
to resisters. As a result of extreme pressure, the military reduced many 
of the sentences.
Stockade rebellions increased after 1968 and brought with them 
increased publicity over the less than adequate conditions under which 
inmates were forced to live. More importantly, stockade rebellions 
served to emphasize what a growing number of GIs were beginning to 
realize: the military’s basic denial of any kind of rights and freedoms for 
enlisted individuals.
Although the above account of resistance in 1968 deals only with 
a small number of cases, it does illustrate that resistance was not only 
taking on a collective nature but it also was no longer solely confined to 
the war issue. More and more enlisted people were defining the military 
per se as oppressive, and deciding to confront it rather than withdraw. 
As l he self-generated protest increased, dissident GIs saw larger numbers 
of civilian radicals and antiwar groups taking an interest in them and 
willing to aid them in their struggle.
THe FiNAl PERiod
In 1969 and the following years, the issue of constitutional rights 
came to the forefront of the GI movement. The war, however, remained 
the most appropriate vehicle for confronting the issue. This larger 
concern had been precipitated by the military’s reaction to and handling 
of antiwar dissenters. The military inadvertently pricked the 
consciousness of some hitherto uninvolved GIs and civilians by its 
heavy-handed repression of initial dissent. The dilemma confronting the 
movement at that time was one of transforming what appeared to be a 
growing body of partisan support into active support. In general, 
enlisted personnel were aware that any gains made by the movement 
would be in the form of “public goods,” benefits which would accrue to 
all GIs regardless of whether or not they took an active role in the 
movement. Although initially direct confrontation of military authority, 
such as refusals of orders and distribution of “subversive” literature on
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base, functioned as the main tactic, less risky behavior, such as rap 
sessions and political meetings in the barracks, were also employed with 
the hope that these relatively safe actions would increasingly involve 
larger numbers of GIs. Despite these efforts, the majority of the GIs 
preferred to remain sympathetic bystanders.
In 1970, GI participation in antiwar demonstrations was 
considerable. Although the possibility of punitive sanctions loomed 
large, the 1969 directive on dissent issued by the Department of Defense 
made such participation legal if the demonstration was off the base in the 
United States, and if GIs participating were off-duty and out of uniform. 
Various GI papers stressed the legality of participation and many 
advertised names and addresses of lawyers willing to defend any GI 
punished for participating. The largest nation-wide participation of GIs 
was in May, 1970 in what the GIs termed “Armed Farces Day.” This 
demonstration was held in conjunction with the tradition Armed Forces 
Day celebrations. GIs at Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Bragg, Fort Lewis, 
Fort Devens, and other bases turned out to protest the war and the 
military. Estimates of the numbers involved ranged from 1,500 at Fort 
Bragg and 500 at Fort Hood down to 20-30 at Fort Devens.7 Black 
soldiers continued to step up their fight against racism. In July, 250 
black GIs revolted at Fort Hood, burning two “Re-Up” offices and a BEQ 
building. At Fort Carson, also during July, 200 black soldiers seized a 
section of the base while fighting off the military police. In Heidelberg, 
West Gennany, 1000 black and white GIs held a July rally against racism 
in the army. While these demonstrations by black military personnel 
were not the first signs of growing antiracist sentiment, the expanding 
scope and intensity of this resistance in conjunction with the antiwar, 
anti-military position of many white enlisted people did present a 
formidable threat to the brass... at least the military defined it as such.
By 1971, there were approximately 26 anti-military and antiwar 
coffeehouses, along with an estimated 144 underground GI papers and 
a nationwide network of GI counseling sendees.8 The estimate of 144 
newspapers may seem unreasonable, but a significant number of these 
papers were very short-lived due to financial problems, military 
harassment, and staff turnovers. The papers themselves fell into two 
general categories: 1) “base papers” which dealt primarily with the 
act ivities on a part icular base and were generally confined to that specific 
military installation; and, 2) “national papers” representing more of a 
news sendee publication, which detailed resistance and court-martial 
cases at bases all across the country and overseas. The national papers 
were distributed all of the U.S. and abroad to GIs and interested civilians, 
largely through subscriptions and clandestine distribution networks, 
including to units in Vietnam. Through the GI press, activist GIs were 
aware that their colleagues at other bases were engaged in similar acts 
of resist ance, and they were constant ly informed of the responses ol the 
military authorities. The papers continually published self-help items 
for GIs, informing them of various groups and lawyers willing to defend
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them, as well as informing them about such things as conscientious 
objection and rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The 
establishment and proliferation of the GI press served to bridge some of 
the structural limitations GIs faced in regard to communication and 
mobility, and helped to foster a feeling a membership and interaction 
between activist GIs and movement cell organizations.
In 1971 and 1972 resistance directed against the military and 
the war continued. GIs joined civilians in demonstrations around the 
country, as well as conducting their own protests on posts. In addition 
to resistance and U.S. military installations, there were numerous 
reports out of Vietnam detailing refusals to engage the enemy on the part 
of some combat troops. While GI and antiwar civilian groups were quick 
to exploit the different protests as indicative of the strength of the GI 
movement, there remains some question as to whether these incidents 
were indeed related to the GI movement ormore a result of the immediate 
situational contingencies of combat. While the GI movement may have 
been, in part, a motivating factor behind the sporadic instances of 
combat refusal in Vietnam, it is equally true that the movement was 
basically ineffectual in creating any type of massive resistance among 
combat troops. Similar examples of troop demoralization occurred in 
Korea as that war was winding down.
HiE DiAlECTics of R esistance
As was pointed out above, the initial phase of the GI movement 
(1965-1967) was characterized by a number of individuals protesting the 
war, with no real communication among themselves and probably not 
even any knowledge of each other’s acts. These individual acts of 
resistance arose in a period of “cultural drift” symbolized by the 
beginnings of a serious questioning of the legitimacy and purpose of the 
Vietnam war by many segments of the American public. This growing 
sentiment combined with a Cold War ambivalence among many, 
particularly liberals, to the increasing size and dominance of the military 
establishment in American society. It was also significant that many of 
the initial acts of resistance by military personnel, especially the most 
publicized ones, were earned out by officers. Their dissent was given 
more credence by the public, and the severe sanctions by the military— 
in an atmosphere which was becoming increasingly hostile to the war 
effort and the military—created a number of heroes. In a climate of 
opinion where civil liberties and the right to dissent were increasingly 
brought to public attention through the civil rights movement and the 
beginnings of student dissent, the military’s response of rather harsh 
sentencing did not go unnoticed. The military’s decision to severely 
sanction some of its own kind (officers) for protesting a war which more 
and more civilians were coming to question was seen by many as a 
repressive rather than a justified disciplinary measure.
In 1968 antiwar sentiment increased as did antiwar 
confrontations. It was also the year in which the total number of active 
duty enlisted personnel reached its peak for the Vietnam conflict and the 
year in which draft inductions for the army hit the top level of 334,222.9 
The military, particularly the Army, was confronted with a mass of young 
people, many of whom were in the military against their will, required to 
fight a war in which many of them did not believe. The fact that all of them 
had been exposed to and some had participated in antiwar demonstrations 
and they know were all grouped together on various military bases gave 
rise to certain self-generated action among enlisted people. Resistance 
look place as some GIs acted against the war explicitly, and, in so doing, 
implicitly tested the degree to which enlisted personnel enjoy constitutional 
rights. Confronted with a situation which they perceived to be a real 
threat to discipline and morale, the military continued to respond in a 
manner best described as panic. Their immediate response, typical of 
a regime feeling itself threatened, consisted of swift and harsh punitive 
action. As resistance reared its head beyond the individual acts of 1965- 
1967, the Pentagon ordered a hard-nosed position against dissenters.10 
The expressed rationale for a policy of harsh suppression hinged on the 
military’s need for discipline and control, while the latent intention 
continued to be a scare tactic designed to intimidate other GIs.
For activist GIs, the military’s policy of handling dissent not only 
increased the sense of struggle but also provided the movement with 
more publicity than they could generate themselves. The military, 
already under attack for Vietnam, was now roundly criticized for its 
handling of dissident GIs and its blatant denial of the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of press, assembly, and speech. The handling of 
political activists helped to raise some fundamental issues that perhaps 
would not have surfaced had the military initially pursued a different 
policy.
It was at this time (1968) that civilian activists started to view the 
GI as a potential ally in the antiwar, anticapitalism struggle. Prior to 
1968 those who accepted induction into the armed forces were written 
off as potential radical partisans. Antiwar organizations and other 
radical groups began to add GI names to their mailing lists, and 
coffeehouses were set up near military bases by civilians with the 
purpose of providing a place where GIs could congregate and vent their 
hostilities. The coffeehouses were also an attempt on the part of the 
largely middle-class antiwar movement to break down the barriers 
between themselves and their working-class counterparts in the military. 
Civilian groups provided GIs with legal defense as well. Quite cognizant 
that court-martials would be readily forthcoming for radical GIs, 
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union, National 
Emergency Civil Liberties Union, and the GI Civil Defense Committee 
offered their support. These organizations generated considerable 
publicity for the cases in which they were involved. Undoubtedly, more 
GIs were willing to run the risk of dissent with the realization that a
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defense network was established to challenge any punitive action on the 
part of the military. In addition to some important legal victories, the 
adverse publicity directed against the military and its system of justice 
has led military authorities into a more rigorous scrutiny of both the case 
they wish to prosecute and the types of punishment they wish to dole out.
In response to growing dissent and mounting adverse publicity 
for the military, Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor issued a 
memorandum in May of 1969 titled “Guidance on Dissent.” The 
statement instructed commanders to adopt a more relaxed attitude with 
regard to GI coffeehouses, the GI press, and political resistance in 
general. Too liberal for some, especially the House Armed Services 
Committee, the guidelines were reissued in September, 1969. The 
revised statement in effect wiped out the recommendations for tolerance 
in the initial directive. The new directive de-emphasized constitutional 
restraints on commanders and at the same time added to their repressive 
options. Notably absent from the revised document was the phrase “to 
impose only such minimum restraints as are necessary to enable the 
Army to perform its mission.”11 The military found itself, or perhaps 
placed itself, in an unenviable position. In attempting to short-circuit 
what they considered to be a serious breakdown in discipline and 
morale, the inadvertently spawned a growing body of criticism of the 
military justice system and specifically of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.
While the military’s inexperience with political resistance did 
lead them to err and overreact on many occasions, they did learn from 
their mistakes. In the years following 1969, they made greater use of 
administrative discharges and in general pursued a somewhat more 
tolerant position vis-a-vis dissent.
ThE GI M o v e m e n t : A n A sse ssm e n t
In terms of its stated goals and objectives, which, aside from 
ending the war, involved mainly institutional structural reform, the GI 
movement was, not surprisingly, far from successful. It is difficult to 
believe that even the most die-hard GI organizers ever felt the movement 
could produce major changes in an organization as firmly entrenched as 
the military. The movement made a discernible, yet largely ineffective, 
attempt at fostering subversion within the ranks. There are a number 
of possible explanations for the movement’s failure to create an effective 
challenge on a mass scale against the Vietnam-era military. Some of the 
more glaring ones can be singled out here.
The GI movement was inextricably intertwined with the New Left. 
In the course of its development, the organized element of the movement 
found itself relying more and more on this sector of the civilian 
population. While the outside support was necessary if the movement 
was to transcend some of the limitations in political resourcesconfronting 
it. the GI movement became to “civilianized,” particularly in its ideological
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orientation. As the movement began to gather momentum and, 
correspondingly, the civilian input loomed larger and larger, the middle 
class ideological rhetoric of the New Left began to overshadow some of 
the more pragmatic day-to-day concerns of the GIs themselves. The 
feeling of helplessness and powerlessness that many GIs felt could not 
be adequately dealt with by sweeping references to “imperialism” and the 
“military industrial complex.”
If one grants that an extremely inequitable Vietnam-era draft 
resulted in a predominantly lower-middle and working-class military, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the middle-class emphasis that the 
organized element of the movement adopted under New Left influence 
lacked meaning for a significant number of GIs. As the movement 
strayed from issues directly related to the immediate self-interest of GIs, 
it increasingly reduced the possibility of mobilizing the discontent of 
large numbers of enlisted personnel. In a veiy real sense, the movement 
failed to integrate itself with the “ordinary” nonideological GI.
Another reason for the movement’s failure to mobilize massive 
discontent stemmed from its own internal contradictions. Factionalism 
developed over tactics. There were also disputes over the proper role that 
civilian radicals should play in the GI movement. A  major point of 
contention concerned those groups who, on the one hand, maintained 
that civilians should provide support to GIs but leave the actual control 
and operation of project to the GIs themselves (such as the Student 
Mobilization Committee, and United States Servicemen's Fund), and 
those groups who, on the other hand, wanted to function as a type of 
vanguard party leading the struggle against the military (such as the 
Socialist Workers Party/Young Socialist Alliance and the Youth Against 
War and Fascism). The orientation of the former groups appeared to be 
directed more toward democratizing the military, while that of the latter 
seemed more concerned with creating a broader revolutionary youth 
cohort. It was the latter who turned out to be more vociferous, and the 
GI movement came to be identified with them.
Although the GI movement claims to have been a significant 
factor in instigating troop dissent in Vietnam, there is little evidence to 
support this contention. The sporadic cases of troops refusing to go into 
combat, and acts such as fraggings appear to have been inspired by 
factors more or less separate from the stateside GI movement. Rather 
than viewing combat refusals as consequences of the GI movement, it 
seems more reasonable to interpret both phenomena as products of the 
anti-Vietnam war malaise affecting the larger society. As the war 
continued, reports from Vietnam indicated that more and more GIs were 
sharing the same disillusionment with the war as Americans at home 
were experiencing.
The GI movement was also ineffective in dealing with racial 
issues.12 Some of the organizations did have a multi-racial membership 
base, but the black participants seemed to be token members. Black 
soldiers began forming their own organizations in an effort to meet the
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needs of black service personnel. For the most part, black GIs were 
waging a separate battle with military authorities. From the perspective 
of black GIs, their battle was qualitatively different from the one being 
conducted by the whites. Black soldiers discovered that the military was 
a microcosm of American society and that the problems confronting 
blacks in the military were not significantly different from those which 
faced them in the civilian world. Just as the New Left organizations failed 
to bring about a desired coalition with blacks and other minorities in 
civilian society, so the GI movement proved deficient in this realm as 
well.
Summary ANd ConcIusIon
The GI movement made a discernible, but largely ineffective 
attempt to foster subversion within the ranks. It failed to mobilize the 
discontent of the large bulk of GIs into a unified antiwar, anti-military 
force. To be sure, part of the failure stemmed from the fact that those 
who were most radical in the 1960s were also those who enjoyed 
deferments from military service. While a few entered the military with 
the avowed purpose of organizing, most remained on the outside and 
attempted to organize GIs from that vantage point. This not only 
engendered a certain degree of resentment on the part of GIs, but the 
“outsiders” were unable, or perhaps unwilling, to grasp the concerns of 
GIs. Though the movement had to rely on civilian support to get off the 
ground, civilian groups appear to have co-opted the movement in an 
attempt to exploit GI resistance for ideological purposes. The New Left 
was never able to overcome its elitism. The same mistake had been made 
in the abortive effort to radicalize workers. Even for GIs who were 
sympat hetic to the GI movement’s aims, the lack of a clear-cut strategy 
and program of action resulted in the overshadowing of the hoped for 
gains by the very real risks involved in striving for them. In simple terms, 
it was not worth it.
Although the movement faltered partially because of its own 
internal contradictions, its inability to radicalize a large constituency of 
GIs was, in the final analysis, testimony to the military’s system of social 
control. The military went a long way in defusing dissent after it had 
learned from its initial mistakes. 12
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